Considering the effects of the contractor's conflict behaviors on the project benefit, a decision model between the owner and contractor's conflict behaviors in construction projects was constructed using the principal-agent theory and game theory. e model was analyzed under nonconflicting and conflicting conditions, and a numerical simulation and example analysis were proposed to verify the constructed model's conclusion. e results showed that the effort levels of the owner and contractor not only relate to benefit-sharing coefficient and effort outcome coefficient but also depend on the contractor's ability of converting the conflict into benefit and the loss caused by conflict behaviors. A higher ability of converting conflicts into benefits and lower levels of the loss caused by conflict behaviors for the contractor lead to lower levels of the net benefit of the owner, conversely higher levels of the net benefit of the contractor. Balancing the contractor's ability of converting conflicts into benefits and the loss caused by conflict behaviors lead to a more reasonable risk allocation between the owner and contractor, improving the effort level and net benefit. To add value to the construction project, the owner should establish an impartial and reasonable benefit-sharing mechanism, optimize the owner and contractor's resource arrangement, maximize the positive effect of conflict on project benefits, and avoid the negative effect of conflict. Few studies to date have investigated the effects of conflict behaviors on project benefits in terms of modeling and simulation in construction projects. As such, this study bridges this gap and contributes significant theoretical and practical insights about managing conflict behaviors in an interorganizational context, thus enhancing performance in construction projects.
Introduction
A typical construction project involves numerous projectbased organizations, including the owner, the contractor, the subcontractor, the designer, and the consultant [1] . is creates a complex adaptive system with common objectives.
e resources exchange and knowledge transfers occur between different participants during the project implementation.
e heterogeneity of diverse participants inevitably leads to project conflicts. Losses caused by conflicts with untimely and inappropriate solutions account for approximately 3-5% of the total project investment [2] . Project conflicts involving project-based organizations occur along with the project life cycle occur from the initial stage to the operational stage. Because of these conflicts, project-based organizations experience an increasingly negative relationship, particularly between the owner and the contractor [3] .
ese adversarial behaviors include disparities between the owner and contractor, the objective conflict between the owner and contractor, and contention about resources based on different objectives. ese behaviors consistently lead to disputes and negotiations between the owner and contractor, making it difficult to achieve an ideal cooperative effect [4] . Furthermore, these adversarial behaviors consistently lead to time and cost overruns, and complicate achievement of project objectives [5] . A critical factor for these behaviors is the absence of a conflict management mechanism, especially between the owner and contractor. erefore, more attention should be paid to investigate the occurrence of conflicts and mechanisms for managing it.
Managing construction projects inevitably involves contracts between the owner and contractor. Contracts are usually incomplete due to the inherent nature of construction projects; these projects have complex and uncertain transactions and processes, result in single products, and are unique-they only happen once [6] . ese contracts significantly impact project success, particularly on projects involving more complex construction technologies and more specific divisions of work. All the efforts of project-based organizations are centered on project performance; inconsistencies in objectives, knowledge, and benefits lead to conflicts, thereby negatively impacting performance [7, 8] . Project participants are interdependent of each other, consistently leading to conflicts due to the diversity of knowledge and benefits [9] . Furthermore, the different core capabilities, information asymmetry, and unclear rights and responsibilities between participants also lead to conflicts [10] .
is study constructed a decision model using game theory to examine conflict behaviors between the owner and contractor. In this model, the contractor is assumed to trigger the conflict behavior.
e owner receives and responses to the conflict behavior. erefore, the model can be used to assess: (i) under what conditions the contractor will trigger the conflict behavior; (ii) under what conditions the contractor can obtain a benefit from the conflict behavior; and (iii) how the owner can guard against the loss caused by the conflict behavior. Previous studies focused on the factors influencing conflicts and their effects on performance using empirical data. Few studies, however, have investigated the internal mechanism in terms of modeling and simulations in construction projects. is study bridges this gap and contributes significant theoretical and practical insights about conflicts occurring in an interorganizational context. ese insights can enhance management performance in construction projects.
Literature Review
Conflict is a phenomenon that occurs when there are different beliefs, thoughts, and benefits between two or more individuals and is a complicated social and psychological phenomenon involving different levels and dimensions [11] .
ese different types and levels of conflict can interact and be interdependent [12] . Recently, researchers have introduced conflict theory to the field of construction project management. is study area has emerged because of the interdependencies and diversity between participants and imperfect management mechanisms, which may cause conflicts in construction projects [13] .
e traditional definition of conflict emphasizes the opposition of objectives within a competitive background, and proposes that conflict originates from the opposite relationships with respect to benefits. Resource scarcity and the divergence of objectives are baseline factors assumed by this definition. e main result is that one party achieves its own objectives at the cost of other party's benefit. Conflict behaviors between an owner and contractor, the research object for this study, reflect a type of interorganizational conflict, namely, the conflict behavior between stakeholders in construction projects. Sources of conflicts in construction projects include limited public resources, different understandings of the project plan, and different task priorities [14, 15] . Additionally, the industrial characteristics of the building industry create sources of conflicts, including the discreteness of the construction link, low efficiencies, and cost overruns [16] . erefore, conflict in construction projects is an interaction between different participants with different perceptions and viewpoints on a process or task. Conflict results from participant-related factors, project-related factors, and issues related to communication, benefit allocation, and trust. e background of projects provided a suitable environment to analyze conflict, because conflicts in construction projects are behaviorally related, and significantly affect performance.
Conflict can have constructive and destructive effects on performance. In construction projects, the traditional view of conflict is that it causes destructive effects. Xue et al. [17] proposed that performance is an interactive result of collaboration between multiple parties; because conflicts hinder collaboration, they are detrimental to performance. Conflicts can strain the owner and contractor relationship, impeding effective communication, and resulting in cost and time overruns, and low quality and satisfaction [18, 19] . However, the specific tasks of the project were unconventional. Conflicts can provide different views and knowledge with which to address tasks, improving decision quality [20, 21] .
e effects of conflicts on performance may relate to management strategies; different strategies have different results [22] . Chen [23] explored the positive and negative effects in project value creation and found that the total life cycle adjusted the task conflict and project value. Anderson and Polkinghorn [24] discussed the importance of the conflict resolution skills and methods in constructing the Woodrow Wilson bridge; they concluded that process conflict had the greatest influence on performance. Brockman [25] surveyed 74 participants in different construction projects; 56% of respondents proposed that relationship conflict had destructive effects on performance. Puck and Pregernig [26] conducted a long-term survey of 92 construction teams, arguing that different types of task conflicts had different effects on performance. Chen et al. [3] concluded that conflicts between the owner and contractor were represented by an inverted U shape on cost performance; only moderate degrees of conflict could improve performance. Chen et al. [27] proposed that emotional conflicts effectively mediated decisions and philanthropic paternalism, using empirical data from 108 top managers. Wu [28] found that process and relationship conflicts were negatively related to project success, and task conflict contributed to project success. erefore, there is still equivocal how conflicts affect performance in construction projects; for example, there is inadequate information about the internal interaction mechanism of conflict. Researchers have validated the constructive and destructive effects on performance using empirical data; however, the interaction mechanism still needs to be discovered and analyzed. Modeling and simulation methods are effective tools to uncover the internal mechanism, due to the inherent nature of construction projects.
is study assumed that the contractor is the triggering party and can trigger conflicts through claims and project changes [29] . e owner directly bears the consequence of conflicts, while conflict behaviors can be restrained through reward and penalty mechanism signed in contracts [30] . e contractor experiences two consequences of conflict behavior: gain or lose. erefore, this study constructed a decision model using game theory to analyze the internal mechanisms of conflict behaviors on performance. e model analysis and conclusions can clarify the effect of conflict on performance, and contribute to the development of effective conflict management strategies.
is study contributes significant theoretical and practical insights to the existing body of knowledge on conflict management. is study provides a useful reference for project managers maximize the advantages of the positive effects of conflicts, and avoid the negative effects of conflicts.
Model Description and Solution

Model Description.
Assume there are two equal projectbased organizations: the owner and the contractor. ese organizations cooperate with each other to achieve the successful delivery during project implementation. Conflicts between the owner and contractor consistently occur due to the temporary and dynamic nature of cooperation. is study does not consider the time value of money and proposes the following hypotheses:
(i) e owner is risk-neutral and the contractor is riskaverse. e effort levels of the contractor and owner are e 1 and e 2 , respectively. e functions of the cost of effort for the contractor and owner are expressed as follows:
In this study, the parameter e i is not limited to e i > 0, which means the effort levels of the contractor and owner can be less than zero. If this occurs, the cooperation between the contractor and owner is negative, with neither being willing to allocate resources. e coefficients of the cost of effort for the contractor and the owner are the same and are assigned as one. Generally, the coefficients of the cost of effort are not the same and can be other values. is study focuses on the effects of conflicts on performance; as such, the influences of the coefficients of the cost of effort are not included.
(ii) Assume the contractor and owner can balance their effort level. e project outcome function can be written as [31] R e 1 , e 2 � κ 1 e 1 + κ 2 e 2 + ε.
In this expression, the parameters of κ 1 > 0 and κ 2 > 0 are the outcome coefficients of effort levels of the contractor and owner. e coefficients reflect their integrated technology and management level. is is manifested by the ability to transfer input resources to outcomes and is related to staff quality, operational level, and technological ability [32] . e contractor and owner cannot directly observe each other's effort level; the levels can be evaluated based on the input resources and the achievement of objectives. e parameters e 1 , e 2 , and ε are mutually independent. e parameter ε is normally distributed as N(0, σ 2 ), reflecting the influence of the external uncertainty on the outcome function.
(iii) Assume the owner provides a linear incentive contract for the contractor, written as S � Ω + βR(e 1 , e 2 ). In this equation, the parameter Ω is a fixed reward the owner provides the contractor. is reward is a constant and cannot stimulate the contractor to adopt a higher level of effort. us, the value can be assigned to zero [33] . e parameter β is a coefficient of the project outcome sharing and is within the range 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
is range reflects the incentive degree of the owner [34] . Additionally, this study focuses on conflict behaviors between the owner and contractor. is is a type of cooperative conflict because the owner and contractor cooperate to achieve successful project delivery, while also maximizing their own benefits. In this situation, inconsistent objectives may lead to conflict behaviors. is study focuses on conflict behaviors during the construction stage, when the contractor has superior information and can trigger conflicts through project changes and claims. us, the contractor is the party that can trigger conflicts. In contrast, the owner can only respond to the conflict based on the conflict type and the results. (iv) When the contractor adopts conflict behaviors, the contractor benefits in two ways. One is the contractual coefficient of benefit sharing (β) and the other is the benefit converted through the conflict. Assuming the benefit converted through the conflict depends on the effort levels of the contractor (e 1 ) and the owner (e 2 ) and the coefficient (μ) of converting conflicts to benefits for the contractor (0 < μ < 1). erefore, the benefits converted through the conflict can be presented as μe 1 e 2 , which are paid by the owner. e coefficient of converting conflicts to benefits for the contractor (μ) reflects the bargaining ability of the contractor who is adopting conflict behaviors. e coefficient relates to the qualification, similar project experiences, and reputation. Additionally, the owner can adjust the level of effort to affect the benefits converted through the conflict. Generally, high values for the coefficient of converting conflicts to benefits and efforts of the contractor lead to lower levels of effort for the owner, even a negative value of the effort level.
Furthermore, when the contractor adopts conflict behaviors, the owner must spend time to address the conflict and prevent the loss. is may lead to the owner distrusting the contractor. Under this condition, adopting conflict behaviors may lead to both current and future losses for the Advances in Civil Engineeringcontractor. Current losses include failures of project changes and claims and accelerated costs due to an extended conflict resolution period. Future losses include losing opportunities for future cooperation, and a lower reputation due to an unsuitable conflict environment. Assume the coefficient of loss caused by conflict behaviors is η and satisfies the condition of 0 < η < 1. e loss caused by conflict behaviors is ηe 1 ; this variable relates to the effort level, input resources, and cooperative attitude of the contractor. is reflects the fact that higher levels of effort lead to higher levels of loss for the contractor adopting conflicts. e contractor may trigger conflict behaviors when μe 1 e 2 > ηe 1 . In other words, the contractor triggers conflict behaviors only when the contractor estimates the benefits exceed the loss brought by the conflicts.
erefore, when there are conflict behaviors between the owner and contractor, the function of net benefits of the contractor can be expressed as
e function of net benefits of the owner can be written as
e function of project outcome can be written as
Model Solution
Solution under Nonconflicting Behavior Condition.
To compare the effects of conflict behaviors on performance, the proposed model first considered nonconflicting behaviors. Under this condition, the function of net benefits of the contractor and the owner and the function of project outcome can be written as
e first partial derivatives of e 1 and e 2 were calculated, and the values were set to zero. is led to the following equation:
We solve the above simultaneous equation for e 1 and e 2 as follows:
According to the extremum attributes of functions, the second partial derivatives of U is z 2 U/zβ (10) into (8), we calculated the partial derivatives of β. e value was then set to zero and solved as
Solution under Conflicting Behavior Condition.
For (3) and (4), the first partial derivatives of e 1 and e 2 were calculated, respectively. e values were then set to zero, and the following equation was obtained:
To solve the above simultaneous equation for e 1 and e 2 , we obtain
According to the extremum attributes of functions, the second partial derivatives of U was z 2 U/zβ
e partial derivatives of β were calculated by substituting (13) into (5). e value was then set to zero and solved as Proof. One has Proof. One has
Model Analysis and Simulations
ze 1 zβ � κ 1 > 0, ze 2 zβ � −κ 2 < 0, ze 2 z(1 − β) � κ 2 > 0.(15ze * 1 zμ � 1 − μ 2 κ 2 (1 − β) − 2μ κ 1 β − η 1 + μ 2 2 > 0 ze * 1 zη � − 1 1 + μ 2 < 0 ze * 2 zμ � − 1 − μ 2 κ 1 β − η + 2μκ 2 (1 − β) 1 + μ 2 2 < 0 ze * 2 zη � 1 1 + μ 2 > 0. (17)
Proposition 4. Under the condition of conflicting behaviors, the coefficient of benefit sharing depends on the outcome ability of the owner and contractor and also depends on the coefficients of converting conflict behaviors to benefits and the loss caused by conflicts. Higher levels of converting conflict behaviors to benefits and lower losses caused by conflicts lead to a higher level of benefit sharing for the owner. is lowers the possibility that the contractor will adopt conflict behaviors. One potential explanation is that conflicts can not only benefit the owner but also simultaneously cause losses to the owner. If the contractor has a greater ability to convert conflicts to benefits, there are more losses for the owner. us, if the owner tends to avoid the loss caused by conflicts, the owner will strengthen contractor incentives. Additionally, when the contractor experiences higher losses caused by conflicts, there are more benefits converted from the conflict for the owner. If the owner's benefits can be forecasted, the owner will decrease contractor incentives to enhance its own benefits.
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Proof. One has
Proposition 5. When a contractor triggers con ict, that con ict may not bring a greater bene t. is depends on the contractor's own characteristics, such as the outcome coe cient of e ort, the ability to convert con icts to bene ts, and the e ort level. It also depends on the e ort level of the owner. e contractor triggering con icts brings a better bene t only when η < 2μκ 2 . is indicates that the bene t from converting the con icts is greater than the loss caused by the con ict. Under this situation, the contractor will trigger con icts; otherwise, the contractor will not trigger con icts. us, the contractor may enhance its own bene t by triggering con icts. Consequently, the owner may increase its own bene t by adopting reasonable con ict management strategies. erefore, if the owner can select reasonable con ict management strategies, it may create a better project bene t. is validates the hypothesis that con icts may have a positive e ect on project bene ts.
Proof. One has (5), (13), and (14), we set κ 1 5, κ 2 4, ρσ 2 20, μ 0.6, and η 0.3. We then simulate the e ects of e ort levels (e 1 , e 2 ) on the project bene t (U), the contractor's net bene t (U 1 ), and the owner's net bene t (U 2 ). Figure 2 shows the results. Figure 2(a) shows that project bene ts reach an optimal value only when the e ort levels of the contractor and owner (e * 1 , e * 2 ) achieve a stable and balanced state. is is consistent with the model analysis. Figures 2(b) and 2(c) show that the net bene ts of the owner and contractor increase as the other parties' e ort level is enhanced; the outcome of enhancing their own e ort levels is represented by an inverted U curve. is re ects the fact that the contractor will decide whether to trigger con icts, based on the owner's e ort level. e owner will adjust its own strategy, based on the contractor's behavior. us, the e ort levels of the contractor and owner a ect each other, as well as their own net bene ts. Additionally, for the owner and contractor, adjusting their own e ort levels is critical to enhancing their own net bene ts. However, increasing their own e ort levels does not necessarily enhance their own net bene ts. is depends on the other parties' e ort level.
Model Simulations
E ects of E ort Levels of the Owner and Contractor on Project Bene ts. Based on (3)-
us, the owner's optimal strategy is adjusting its strategy based on the contractor's behaviors. (10), (11), (13) , and (14), we set κ 1 Figure 1 : e e ort levels of the owner and contractor under di erent conditions. 6 Advances in Civil Engineering con icts to bene ts (μ) and the loss caused by con icts (η) on e ort levels (e 1 , e 2 ), under con icting and noncon icting conditions. Figure 3 shows the results, demonstrating that when there are con ict behaviors between the contractor and owner, higher levels of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene t (μ) and lower levels of the coe cient of the loss caused by con icts (η) contribute to higher levels of e ort by the contractor. Lower levels of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene ts (μ) and higher levels of the coe cient of the loss caused by con icts (η) contribute to Figure 3: E ects of coe cients of converting con icts to bene t and the loss caused by con icts on e ort levels. (a) E ects of μ and η on e 1 .
E ects of Coe cients of Converting Con icts to Bene ts and the Loss Caused by Con icts on E ort Levels. Based on
(b) E ects of μ and η on e 2 .
higher levels of e ort of the owner. is is consistent with Proposition 3. Compared with Figures 3(a) and 3(b) , the e ort levels of the contractor and owner under con icting conditions may exceed their corresponding values under noncon icting condition. is re ects the fact that if conicts can bring more bene ts for the owner and contractor, both may be willing to initiate con ict behaviors. is also means con ict behaviors may have a constructive e ect on project bene ts, which bene ts the e ort levels of the owner and contractor. e critical question is whether the constructive e ect simultaneously a ects the owner and contractor. In other words, it creates the question of whether there is a balanced point (μ * , η * ) that maximizes values of (e 1 , e 2 ). In fact, this situation may be achieved when considering the e ects of di erent types of con icts. e contractor should consider and control the relationship between the bene t and loss caused by con ict behaviors, adjusting their in uence on the owner's e ort level. Furthermore, the owner should adjust its strategy to respond to contractor behaviors. Under these conditions, con ict behaviors between the owner and contractor may be constructive and contribute to project bene ts. is veri es the constructive aspect of con ict behaviors in construction projects.
E ects of Coe cients of Converting Con icts to Bene t and the Loss Caused by Con icts on the Coe cient of Bene t
Allocation. Based on (11), (13) , and (14), we set κ 1 5, κ 2 4, and ρσ 2 20. We then simulate the e ects of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene t (μ), and the loss caused by con icts (η) on the coe cient of bene t allocation (β), under con icting and noncon icting conditions. Figure  4 shows the results, demonstrating that con ict behaviors between the contractor and owner lead to higher levels of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene t (μ) and lower levels of the coe cient of the loss caused by con icts (η) contribute to a greater allocation of bene ts to the contractor.
is is consistent with Proposition 4. Compared with the noncon icting condition, the coe cient of bene t allocation (β) may be higher or lower than the corresponding value with the variation of coe cients of converting con icts to the bene t and loss caused by conicts. is re ects the fact that triggering con ict behaviors would not always bene t the contractor; in fact, it may cause a loss for the contractor. erefore, the contractor should balance coe cients of converting con icts to bene t and the loss caused by con icts and consider the owner's scoping strategy. is would lead the contractor to reasonably select its own behaviors and e ort level, with a goal of increasing its own net bene t.
E ects of Coe cients of Converting Con icts to Bene t and the Loss Caused by Con icts on Project Bene ts.
Based on (3)- (8), we set κ 1 5, κ 2 4, ρσ 2 20, μ 0.6, and η 0.3. en, we simulate the e ects of the coe cients of converting con icts to bene ts (μ) and the loss caused by con icts (η) on the project bene t (U), the contractor's net bene t (U 1 ), and the owner's net bene t (U 2 ) under conicting and noncon icting conditions. Figure 5 shows the results and demonstrates that lower levels of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene t (μ) and lower levels of the coe cient of the loss caused by con icts (η) contribute to greater project bene ts. Higher levels of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene t (μ) and lower levels of the coe cient of the loss caused by con icts (η) contribute to greater net bene ts for the contractor. Lower levels of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene t (μ) and higher levels of the coe cient of the loss caused by con icts (η) contribute to greater net bene ts for the owner. Compared with Figures 5(b) and 5(c), the net bene t of the contractor is re ected in an inverted U shape, with the variation of the coe cient of converting con icts to bene t (μ), the owner's net bene t is represented by an inverted U shape with the variation of the coe cient of the loss caused by con icts (η).
is indicates that if the owner can design a reasonable con ict management mechanism, the contractor can balance the relationship between the bene t and loss caused by con ict behaviors. Under this situation, the destructive e ect of con icts can be avoided, and the constructive e ect of con icts can be introduced. Additionally, compared with Figures 5(a)-5(c) , con ict behaviors between the owner and contractor appear to have constructive e ects on project bene ts, thus strengthening the net bene ts for the owner and contractor.
Numerical Example.
In this section, di erent situations of outcome coe cients of the owner and contractor are addressed to compare the model results. In addition, different situations of the coe cients of converting con icts to bene t (μ) and the loss caused by con icts (η) under the same outcome coe cients of the owner and contractor are calculated. Applying the con ict decision model with owner and contractor parameter values allows the calculation of e ort levels of the owner and contractor, the net bene ts for the owner and contractor, the bene t allocation coe cient, and the project benefits under different situations. Table 1 shows the results.
Conclusions and Implications
is study considered the effects of conflict behaviors on project benefits. Based on the inherent nature of construction projects, this study constructed a decision model between the owner and contractor's conflict behaviors, then analyzed the model under conflicting and nonconflicting conditions. A simulation and numerical example were implemented to verify the conclusions from the model analysis. e study led to four key results. First, effort levels for the contractor and owner only relate to coefficients of benefit sharing and effort outcomes under nonconflicting condition. Effort levels also relate to the coefficients for converting conflicts to benefits and the loss caused by conflicts under conflicting condition. Second, higher levels of the coefficients for converting conflicts to benefits and lower levels of the coefficient of the loss caused by conflicts contribute to a higher level of net benefits for the contractor and a lower level of net benefits for the owner. ird, this study verified the constructive effect of conflict behaviors between the owner and contractor; conflict behaviors may have constructive effects on the project benefits. is can strengthen the net benefits for the owner and contractor. Fourth, if the owner can design a reasonable conflict management mechanism, the contractor can balance and control the benefit and loss caused by conflicts. is has the benefit of strengthening the effort levels for the owner and contractor, improving project benefits.
Due to complementary core abilities and consistency in the willingness to cooperate, conflict behaviors between the owner and contractor in construction projects are cooperative-based conflicts. As such, conflicts may have constructive effects on project benefits. e conclusions of this study highlight three key implications for project management. First, the coefficient of benefit allocation depends on two factors: contractor-related factors, such as the coefficient of effort outcome, converting conflicts to benefits; and project-related factors, such as the project's external uncertainty. Facing a complex external project environment makes it difficult for the owner to evaluate the effort level of the contractor; as such, the owner may adopt a weak incentive intensity. Second, balancing the benefit and loss caused by conflict behaviors can lead to a more reasonable risk allocation between the owner and contractor [35] . is can prompt the owner and contractor to enhance their own effort levels, achieving improvements in benefits. ird, the owner should construct a fair and reasonable benefit-sharing mechanism and optimize the level of resource input and allocation between the owner and contractor. is builds a trust relationship between the owner and contractor, thus avoiding the destructive effects of conflicts and promoting constructive effects.
Few studies have emphasized effects of conflict on construction project benefits. is study constructed a decision model using game theory to bridge this gap. is study contributes significant theoretical and practical insights to manage conflicts in construction projects. However, an evaluation of the proposed model and conclusions must also consider the study's limitations. First, the proposed model considers the interorganizational relationship between the owner and contractor, while the conflict relationship may involve more stakeholders. Second, this study did not address different types of conflicts that may also affect benefits. In project practice, contractor's commitment may change as the project life cycle evolves, and the influence of conflicts on project benefits may change.
ese limitations highlight future research directions. In conclusion, this study contributes to the existing knowledge by proposing and validating a game-based decision model that project managers can use to address conflicts in construction projects. e model highlights practical implications, providing a clear understanding of effects of conflict on benefits in construction projects.
e study also provides a theoretical reference for properly managing conflicts among stakeholders and realizing overall project benefits.
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